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Abstract—Social graphs are widely used in research (e.g., epidemiology) and business (e.g., recommender systems). However,
sharing these graphs poses privacy risks because they contain sensitive information about individuals. Graph anonymization
techniques aim to protect individual users in a graph, while graph de-anonymization aims to re-identify users. The effectiveness of
anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms is usually evaluated with privacy metrics. However, it is unclear how strong existing
privacy metrics are when they are used in graph privacy. In this paper, we study 26 privacy metrics for graph anonymization and
de-anonymization and evaluate their strength in terms of three criteria: monotonicity indicates whether the metric indicates lower
privacy for stronger adversaries; for within-scenario comparisons, evenness indicates whether metric values are spread evenly; and for
between-scenario comparisons, shared value range indicates whether metrics use a consistent value range across scenarios. Our
extensive experiments indicate that no single metric fulfills all three criteria perfectly. We therefore use methods from multi-criteria
decision analysis to aggregate multiple metrics in a metrics suite, and we show that these metrics suites improve monotonicity
compared to the best individual metric. This important result enables more monotonic, and thus more accurate, evaluations of new
graph anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms.
Index Terms—graph anonymization, graph de-anonymization, privacy, privacy metrics, monotonicity, metrics suites
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1 INTRODUCTION
The usage of Internet-based communications systems
such as email or social networks leaves traces that can be
collected and stored in graph form. In these graphs, nodes
represent users and edges represent relationships between
users. Many graph data sets have already been published
for scientific or commercial use [13], [14]. Graph data can
help us understand social networks [12] and improve rec-
ommendations [16], but can also harm user privacy because
of sensitive information revealed by relationships.
To protect privacy, graphs can be anonymized by remov-
ing node identifiers and by changing the graph structure. As
a result, the nodes in the anonymized graph cannot easily
be mapped to their original identifiers if the adversary does
not possess additional knowledge. However, a common
assumption is that adversaries know about an auxiliary
graph with similar structure as well as the correct mapping
for a small number of nodes. Finding new methods for
anonymization and de-anonymization is an active research
area [7], and researchers usually use privacy metrics to
evaluate the effectiveness of their new methods.
The most commonly used metric in graph privacy is
the adversary’s success rate, which gives the percentage of
correctly re-identified nodes [8], [20], [23]. However, even
though we show in this paper that the adversary’s success
rate is indeed a good metric in many scenarios, it has two
important shortcomings: First, it does not reveal much detail
about the privacy of individual nodes because it measures
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privacy on a per-graph level. Second, its common definition
favors de-anonymization algorithms that primarily rely on
local, instead of global, graph properties.
To find a better metric for graph privacy, we analyze
privacy metrics proposed in other fields [32] in terms of
three criteria: monotonicity, evenness, and shared value
range [36]. Monotonicity requires that privacy metrics in-
dicate lower privacy as the adversary’s strength increases.
Evenness requires that the metric values are spread evenly
over their value range, which improves within-scenario
comparisons. Shared value range requires that metrics use
a common value range even when they are applied to
different datasets, anonymization, or de-anonymization al-
gorithms. This improves between-scenario comparisons.
In this paper, we make the following contributions in the
area of privacy measurement:
• We propose a framework for the evaluation of pri-
vacy metrics for graph privacy based on our previous
methodology [30], [36].
• We conduct extensive experiments to analyze the
strength of 26 privacy metrics using 11 graph
datasets, 6 anonymization algorithms, and 6 de-
anonymization algorithms and find that no single
metric excels in all three criteria.
• We find that several popular metrics are not mono-
tonic in graph privacy, including entropy and the
anonymity set size, and give a detailed analysis
why this is the case. This finding is in contrast to
results for other domains, such as vehicular network
privacy [31].
• We propose four concrete metrics suites to improve
the measurement of graph privacy and synthesize
the metrics using the Weighted Product Model from
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2multi-criteria decision analysis. We show that our
metrics suites have higher monotonicity than the best
individual metric.
Our findings are important because our synthesis of
metrics suites shows a convenient way how the strengths
of multiple privacy metrics can be combined to improve the
overall measurement of privacy.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Graph Anonymization and De-anonymization
Structural graph de-anonymization algorithms and corre-
sponding anonymization algorithms have been an active
research area since the mid-2000s [2], when it was dis-
covered that simply removing identifiers from nodes is
not sufficient to prevent node re-identification. Since then,
many anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms
have been proposed [7].
In this paper, we use existing algorithms and an exist-
ing implementation [8] to evaluate the strength of privacy
metrics for graph anonymization and de-anonymization.
We give more detail about the algorithms we used in Sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.3.
2.2 Privacy Metrics for Graph Privacy
The most commonly used privacy metrics in graph
anonymization and de-anonymization are the number of re-
identified nodes [19] and the adversary’s success rate [8],
[20], [23]. These metrics quantify privacy as the actual
privacy breach that an adversary causes.
In the wider privacy research area, other classes of pri-
vacy metrics have been proposed [32], for example measur-
ing the adversary’s uncertainty, information gain, or error.
For example, information-theoretic metrics such as entropy
quantify privacy as the uncertainty that the adversary faces
when re-identifying nodes. These metrics have shown good
strength in other fields such as vehicular networks [36],
but whether they are suitable for graph privacy remains
unknown. In this paper, we examine the suitability and
strength of a wide range of privacy metrics in graph privacy.
De-anonymizability quantification focuses on quantify-
ing structural properties of graph pairs, such as the edge
difference, to study the maximum number of nodes that
could be de-anonymized, given only structural graph in-
formation for a graph and a partially overlapping auxiliary
graph [6], [21]. However, de-anonymizability quantification
does not consider the interplay between anonymization and
de-anonymization algorithms and has limited applicability
in concrete practical scenarios due to its focus on theoretical
limits for abstract graph models [7].
2.3 Criteria for Privacy Metrics
Most privacy metrics do not meet the mathematical cri-
teria for metrics (non-negativity, identity of indiscernibles,
symmetry, and triangle inequality). Instead, several authors
have proposed other criteria that good privacy metrics
should fulfill. For example, metrics should show the adver-
sary’s chances of success [1], show the potential for privacy
violations [3], measure the amount of resources needed by
the adversary [26], and integrate measurements for different
aspects of privacy [24]. However, these criteria do not allow
to directly compare the strength of different privacy metrics.
To this end, we have previously proposed that privacy
metrics should be monotonic, i.e. that they should show
lower privacy levels for stronger adversaries [30], [36].
Most of the work that compares different privacy met-
rics and analyzes in which situations privacy metrics per-
form well is in anonymous communication. For example,
Syverson examines entropy as a metric for anonymity and
concludes that it should not be used in the context of
anonymous communication [26], and Murdoch compares
the strengths and weaknesses of several different metrics
for anonymous communication [18].
In our previous work, we have proposed a methodology
to systematically evaluate different privacy metrics based
on the criterion of monotonicity, and we have applied this
methodology to privacy metrics for genomic privacy [30]
and vehicular networks [31], [36]. In this paper, we adapt
our methodology to examine metrics in graph privacy.
3 METHODOLOGY
We evaluate the strength of privacy metrics for social graphs
in terms of monotonicity, evenness, and shared value range.
In this section, we explain our methodology, which we have
adapted from our prior work [30], [36], [37]. Our method
follows six steps, as illustrated in Figure 1:
1) Import an existing graph data set (Section 3.1)
2) Anonymize the input graph with different
anonymization algorithms (Section 3.2)
3) Subset the input graph to create an auxiliary graph
and define seed mappings as prior information
given to the adversary (Section 3.3)
4) Apply different de-anonymization algorithms to
the anonymized graphs, controlling the adversary’s
strength using the amount of prior information
given to the adversary (Section 3.3)
5) Compute the values of different privacy metrics
based on the output of the de-anonymizer (Section
3.4)
6) Analyze the strength of each privacy metric ac-
cording to the criteria of monotonicity (Section 3.5),
evenness, and shared value range (Section 3.6)
3.1 Graph Datasets
We used eleven graph datasets, all available from
Konect [13], to evaluate the strength of privacy metrics.
Table 1 summarizes the datasets and highlights some of the
graph statistics commonly used to characterize graphs. Our
selection represents a diverse sample of graphs with respect
to 19 graph statistics available in Konect.
3.2 Anonymizing Algorithms
Graph anonymization algorithms modify the nodes or
edges of a graph to prevent the individual nodes from being
identified. The simplest method is to remove the original
identifiers of all nodes while leaving the graph structure
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Fig. 1. Our method to evaluate the strength of privacy metrics for graph privacy, adapted from prior work [36], [37].
TABLE 1
Characteristics of the 11 graph datasets used in our experiments, showing their diversity in several key graph statistics.
Dataset Type Nodes Edges Diameter Avg.
degree
Avg. short-
est path
Clustering
coefficient
Gini co-
efficient
dblp citation 12591 49743 10 8 4.4 0.062 0.66
cora citation 23166 91500 20 8 5.9 0.117 0.52
arxiv coauthors 18771 198050 14 21 4.2 0.318 0.61
dnc communication 2029 5598 8 39 3.4 0.089 0.71
irvine communication 1899 20296 8 63 3.1 0.057 0.65
manufacturing communication 167 5784 5 993 1.9 0.541 0.44
caida computer 26475 53381 17 4 3.9 0.007 0.63
elections online contact 7118 103675 7 29 3.2 0.125 0.75
pgp online contact 10680 24316 24 5 7.5 0.378 0.59
google social 23628 39242 8 3 4.0 0.004 0.66
facebook ego social 4039 88234 8 2 3.7 0.519 0.54
intact. This method has been shown to be susceptible to de-
anonymization attacks [2], [19] and we use it to represent
the baseline for non-anonymized graphs.
In addition, we use five anonymization algorithms
that change the graph structure: Switch [35], k-Degree
Anonymity (k-DA) [15], Differential Privacy (DP) [22], Ran-
dom Walk (RW) [17], and Bounded t-Means (t-Means) [27].
All algorithms operate on a graph Gorig = (Vorig, Eorig),
where Vorig is the set of nodes (vertices) and Eorig is the
set of edges. We use Ganon = (Vanon, Eanon) to denote the
anonymized graph.
Switch [35] randomly chooses two edges in Eorig and
switches them to change Gorig’s structure. This process is
repeated r|Eorig| times, where r is the portion of edges to
be switched. The k-DA algorithm [15] modifies the graph to
achieve k-degree anonymity, so that for each node there are
at least k − 1 other nodes with the same degree. To achieve
this, the algorithm adds edges to Eorig until the node degree
for all nodes meets the requirement. The DP algorithm [22]
transforms the graph to a dK-series and injects noise in
it. Then the perturbed dK-series is used to re-construct a
differentially private graph. The anonymization level of DP
is controlled by the parameter  and the resulting graph sat-
isfies -differential privacy. The random walk algorithm [17]
selects a sequence of vertices starting from v, for each vertex
v ∈ Vorig, as a “walking path” of length t. At the end of each
sequence, one edge is added between the starting vertex
and the ending vertex to change the graph’s structure. The t-
Means algorithm [27] first clusters all the vertices in Vorig into
t clusters based on their degree distances and then matches
the degrees of vertices in a cluster to the degree of their
center vertex by adding or removing edges.
To apply the anonymization algorithms in our experi-
ments, we use the implementations provided in the open-
source software SecGraph [8].
3.3 De-anonymizing Algorithms
Graph de-anonymization attempts to re-identify nodes in
an anonymized graph. De-anonymization algorithms com-
monly assume that the adversary has additional knowledge
in the form of an auxiliary graph Gaux = (Vaux, Eaux) and a
small set of seed mappings between the nodes in Vaux and
the nodes in Vanon.
The auxiliary graph is a sub-graph of the original graph,
i.e. Vaux ⊂ Vorig and Eaux ⊂ Eorig, and the adversary
knows the identifiers of nodes in the auxiliary graph. In our
experiments, we use the overlap of the auxiliary graph with
the original graph as the first way to control the adversary’s
strength: a larger overlap results in a stronger adversary.
The set of seed mappings contains some relationships
between nodes in the anonymized graph Ganon and the
auxiliary graph Gaux that the adversary is assumed to know.
This set of seed mappings is typically small compared to the
size of the graph, and most nodes are unmapped. We use the
number of seed mappings as the second way to control the
adversary’s strength: a larger number of mappings results
in a stronger adversary.
The adversary’s goal is to use the auxiliary graph
Gaux and the seed mappings to generate more map-
pings between the unmapped nodes in Ganon and known
nodes in Gaux, thus breaching graph privacy. In our
experiments, we use six de-anonymization algorithms,
all implemented in SecGraph [8]: Narayanan/Shmatikov
(NS) [20], Ji/Li/Srivatsa/Beyah (JLSB) [9], Korula/Lattanzi
4(KL) [11], Yartseva/Grossglauser (YG) [34], Adaptive De-
Anonymization (ADA) [10], and Distance Vector based de-
anonymization (DV) [25]. Three algorithms (KL, NS, and
YG) rely on seed mappings as a local property of the nodes
to be matched, i.e. only inferring among the nodes that
are one hop away from seed nodes, while the other three
algorithms (ADA, DV, and JLSB) use properties of the global
graph structure.
NS is an iterative algorithm. In each step, the adversary
randomly chooses an unmapped node vanon. If any of vanon’s
neighbors have a known seed mapping to a node vaux, then
the set of vaux’s neighbor nodes forms the set of candidate
original nodes for vanon. Each candidate is scored according
to its node degree, and if the node with the highest score
satisfies an eccentricity criterion it is selected as the most
likely original node. If the reverse mapping from Gaux to
Ganon of the chosen original node is vanon, the resulting
mapping is added to the set of seed mappings and the
process is repeated. The inference stops when the set of seed
mappings stops growing.
The KL algorithm also bootstraps its inference from
seed mappings using a heuristic called similarity witness.
The number of similarity witnesses for a pair of known
and anonymized nodes is the number of seed mapping
relationships between their neighbors. In each step, the pairs
with the highest number of similarity witnesses are chosen
and added to the set of seed mappings.
Similarly, the YG algorithm randomly selects one unused
seed mapping in each iteration and increments the scores
of all its neighbor mappings (i.e. mappings between the
neighbors of the known nodes and the neighbors of the
anonymized node in the selected seed mapping). Once a
mapping’s score reaches a threshold, it is added to the set of
seed mappings.
DV uses a node’s distance vector, i.e. the distances
between the node and the seed nodes, to describe the
structural similarity between anonymized nodes and known
nodes. The algorithm maps pairs of nodes that have the
highest structural similarity scores.
JLSB uses five heuristics to calculate the structural sim-
ilarity between anonymized nodes and known nodes: the
node degree, neighborhood, top-K reference distance, land-
mark reference distance, and sampling closeness central-
ity. These heuristics measure both the local and global
properties of each node. The algorithm summarizes these
heuristics into a structural similarity score that indicates
how much an anonymized node is similar to a known node,
thereby finding the most likely mappings.
Similarly, the ADA algorithm calculates structural simi-
larity scores from three centrality measurements: closeness
centrality, betweenness centrality, and degree. In addition,
ADA takes into account the relative distance similarity (sim-
ilar to the distance vector in DV) and inheritance similarity
(controlling the similarity loss over iterations).
3.4 Metrics for Graph Privacy
Based on our survey of privacy metrics [32], we selected
26 privacy metrics to evaluate in our experiments. These
metrics include not only metrics that have already been
used in graph privacy, but also metrics from other domains.
Table 2 summarizes the metrics we used. According to the
taxonomy in [32], the metrics in our study fall into five cat-
egories: uncertainty, information gain/loss, error, similarity,
and success.
TABLE 2
Graph privacy metrics used in our experiments. H/L: high (H) or low (L)
values indicate high privacy. Per-graph metrics give one privacy value
for the entire graph, the other metrics give one privacy value for each
node. The chunk column indicates whether a metric is negatively
affected by SecGraph’s chunking (see Section 5.3.2).
Cat. Metric H/L per-
graph
gnd.
truth
chunk
U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
Anonymity set size H – – X
Collision entropy H – – X
Conditional entropy H – X –
Conditional privacy H – X –
Entropy H – – X
Inherent privacy H – – X
Max-entropy H – – X
Min-entropy H – – X
Normalized entropy H – – –
Quantiles on entropy H – – X
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
ga
in Amount leaked information L X X –
Conditional privacy loss L X X X
Information surprisal L – X –
Loss of anonymity L X X X
Mutual information L – X X
Pearson correlation L – X –
Relative entropy H – X –
Er
ro
r
Absolute error H – X –
Incorrectness H – X –
Mean squared error H – X –
% incorrectly classified H X X –
Sim. Normalized variance H – X –
Su
cc
es
s Adversary’s success rate L X X –
Adversary’s overall success L X X –
Hiding property H X – –
User-specified innocence H X – –
3.4.1 Uncertainty metrics
Uncertainty metrics measure how uncertain the adversary
is about her estimate, assuming that higher uncertainty
corresponds to better privacy.
For example, the anonymity set size for each node in-
dicates how many other nodes the adversary cannot dis-
tinguish from this node. We approximate this notion of
indistinguishability by counting how many candidate nodes
have been assigned a non-zero probability.
All other uncertainty metrics in our study are based on
the information theoretic concept of entropy. Entropy mea-
sures the adversary’s uncertainty based on the probabilities
assigned to each candidate node and indicates the number
of additional bits of information an adversary needs to
successfully de-anonymize a node.
Re´nyi entropy is a generalization of entropy that intro-
duces the parameter α, with the entropy above using α = 1.
With increasingly larger values of α, the influence of high-
probability nodes on the metric increases. For example, min-
entropy with α = ∞ is based only on the node for which
the adversary has the highest probability, representing the
worst-case privacy. In contrast, max-entropy with α = 0 is
based only on the number of nodes. Because max-entropy
does not take into account the adversary’s probabilities, it
5represents the best-case privacy a user can hope for. Collision
entropy with α = 2 is another variant.
Normalized entropy uses max-entropy to normalize en-
tropy to a common value range of [0,1] that does not
depend on the number of nodes. Quantiles on entropy aims to
mitigate the influence of low-probability outliers on entropy,
and thus computes entropy only based on a percentile of
the adversary’s estimated probabilities. Conditional entropy
describes the entropy of the true mapping, conditioned on
the adversary’s estimate.
Inherent privacy, or scaled anonymity set size, is based on
entropy and interpreted as the number of additional yes/no
questions the adversary has to answer to de-anonymize a
node correctly. Conditional privacy is similar to inherent pri-
vacy, measuring the privacy inherent in the true mapping,
given the adversary’s estimate.
3.4.2 Information gain/loss metrics
Information gain/loss metrics focus on the amount of infor-
mation that the adversary gains.
The amount of information leaked counts how many nodes
the adversary re-identified correctly. Pearson correlation com-
putes the correlation between the adversary’s estimate and
true node mapping. High values indicate a positive correla-
tion and thus mean low privacy.
The remaining metrics in this category are based on
information theory. Information surprisal focuses on the prob-
ability the adversary assigns to the true node and can be
interpreted as the amount of surprise felt by the adversary
on learning the true mapping.
Mutual information indicates how much information is
shared between the adversary’s estimate and the true map-
ping, with more shared information indicating lower pri-
vacy. Loss of anonymity is the maximum mutual information
for any node, and thus indicates the worst-case privacy.
Conditional privacy loss is a way of normalizing mutual
information and can be interpreted as the fraction of privacy
lost through the adversary’s estimate.
Relative entropy, or Kullback-Leibler divergence, mea-
sures the distance between the adversary’s estimate and
the true mapping, thus indicating how far the adversary’s
estimate is from the truth.
3.4.3 Error metrics
Error metrics quantify the difference between the adver-
sary’s estimate and the true mapping of candidate nodes.
Incorrectness is the expectation of the adversary’s estima-
tion error, where successful resp. unsuccessful identification
of a node is encoded as 0 resp. 1, and the expectation is
computed using the adversary’s estimated probabilities.
The mean squared error measures the error between the
adversary’s estimated probability distribution and the true
outcome. The absolute error measures the difference between
the adversary’s probability for the true node and the ad-
versary’s highest probability, i.e. for node the adversary
believes to be the true node.
The percentage of incorrectly classified nodes describes the
percentage of nodes that the adversary has de-anonymized
incorrectly, in relation to the total number of nodes in the
graph.
3.4.4 Similarity metrics
Similarity metrics focus on statistical properties that mea-
sure similarity between the adversary’s estimate and the
ground truth.
Normalized variance computes the variance of the differ-
ence between the true mapping and the adversary’s esti-
mate, normalized by the variance of the true mapping. A
higher variance is thought to correlate with higher privacy.
3.4.5 Success metrics
Success metrics evaluate how likely it is that the adversary
succeeds. The adversary’s success rate, or accuracy, indicates
the percentage of nodes that the adversary identified cor-
rectly. In the variant implemented by SecGraph, this metric
indicates the percentage in relation to the number of nodes
that the adversary has attempted to de-anonymize, not to
the total number of nodes in the graph.
The adversary’s overall success rate indicates the success
rate based on the entire graph, not just on the number of
de-anonymization attempts.
The hiding property counts the number of nodes for which
the adversary’s largest probability is below a specified
threshold. This metric indicates the number of nodes that
the anonymizing algorithm has successfully protected from
the adversary. User-specified innocence counts the number of
nodes for which the adversary’s estimated probability for
the true outcome is below a specified threshold, indicating
the number of nodes that can reasonably claim that the
adversary’s de-anonymization attempt was not reliable.
3.5 Computation of Monotonicity Scores
To evaluate the strength of privacy metrics, we require that
they are monotonic, i.e. that they indicate higher privacy
levels for stronger adversaries. For example, we expect
that, with increasing adversary strength, the values of the
adversary’s success rate (as a lower-better metric) decrease,
and that the values of entropy (as a higher-better metric)
increase.
We use the algorithm originally proposed in [30] to
compute monotonicity scores. The algorithm uses two sta-
tistical tests (t-test and rank-sum test) to compare the mean
metric values for each pair of adjacent adversary strengths.
If the difference between the means is statistically signifi-
cant and indicates a change in the expected direction, the
algorithm increases the metrics’ monotonicity score by 1.
If the difference indicates a change in the wrong direction,
the algorithm subtracts 1 from the monotonicity score. If the
changes in metric values change direction, e.g. increasing for
one pair and decreasing for the next, the algorithm reduces
the score by 2 because such a peak may indicate the same
privacy levels for both strong and weak adversaries and is
thus undesirable. A metric’s final monotonicity score is the
average of the scores for the two statistical tests, normalized
to [0, 1].
3.6 Computation of Additional Criteria
In addition to monotonicity, two additional criteria are
useful to judge the strength of privacy metrics, especially
if they will be used for within-scenario comparisons and
between-scenario comparisons [36].
6Within-scenario comparisons compare the privacy levels
of different nodes within the same graph. Ideally, the values
of metrics for within-scenario comparisons should be spread
evenly over the entire value range (evenness). We compute
the evenness of a metric’s value range based on the Crame´r-
von Mises criterion, which measures the goodness of fit
between the uniform distribution U(0,1) and the normalized
metric values for all adversary strengths. We normalize the
Crame´r-von Mises criterion by the number of metric values
to offset the influence of the number of samples.
Between-scenario comparisons compare privacy levels
between different graphs, and ideal metrics use the same
value range regardless of the graph’s characteristics (shared
value range). We formalize this notion by computing the
portion of the global value range for each metric that is used
when the metric is applied to a specific graph.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We conducted extensive experiments to evaluate mono-
tonicity, evenness, and shared value range in a wide range of
scenarios. In this section, we give details on the implemen-
tation and availability of software, the parameter settings
we used, and how we controlled the statistical significance
of our results.
4.1 Implementation
We have implemented our framework for the evaluation of
privacy metrics in Python. Our implementation of privacy
metrics follows the description in [32] and relies on Python
libraries numpy, scipy, and scikit-learn.
For anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms,
we used the open-source software SecGraph [8]. How-
ever, SecGraph’s implementation of de-anonymization al-
gorithms only outputs the adversary’s node mapping and
success rate. To be able to compute other privacy metrics,
we modified the de-anonymization methods to additionally
output the ground truth and the adversary’s estimated prob-
ability distribution. The probability distribution is based
on the adversary’s scores for candidate nodes. When the
adversary tries to map a node vanon to a candidate in a set
of candidate nodes {v1aux, v2aux, ...}, the random variable X
describes the probabilities for each candidate in the set. The
probability for each candidate node is defined as its score
divided by the sum of all scores in the set. In this way, the
adversary creates one probability distribution for each node
she attempts to re-identify.
To automate our experiments and make use of comput-
ing resources available to us, we packaged our framework
in a Docker container and used Boinc and boinc2docker
to distribute the computation to around 60 PCs available
in student labs. Our source code is available at CodeO-
cean [33].
4.2 Parameter Settings
We reproduce parameter settings for the anonymization and
de-anonymization algorithms as much as possible from [8].
However, the parameters given in the SecGraph paper do
not always match the implementation in their software, and
the software parameter choices are not documented. In these
TABLE 3
Parameter settings used in our experiments.
Anonymizers
DP  = 1
k-DA k = 5
RW distance = 2
Switch fraction r = 0.05
t-means max size = 30
De-anonymizers
ADA θ = 0, chunk size = 100,  = 0.5, weights:
wdistance = 0.6,wstructural = 0.2,winheritance = 0.2
DV θ = 0, chunk size = 100
JLSB θ = 0, chunk size = 100, weights: wdegree =
0.3, wneighbor = 0.3, wref distance = 0.4
KL θ = 1, chunk size = 100
NS θ = 0.5
YG θ = 2
Seed numbers 5, 10, 20, 35, 50, 100 (default 50)
Auxiliary ratios 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95 (default 0.85)
cases, we chose parameter settings that seemed reasonable
to us. Table 3 summarizes our parameter settings. The last
two rows show the sequence of parameters we used to
increase the adversary’s strength. We varied seed numbers
and auxiliary ratios in independent sets of experiments and
used the value given as default for the variable that was
kept constant.
Our experiments are based on random inputs, for exam-
ple the selection of seed mappings and the overlap of the
auxiliary graph. To obtain statistically significant results, we
replicated the experiments until the relative error for the
metric values for each combination of dataset, anonymizer,
and deanonymizer was below 5%. 100 replications were
sufficient in most cases, but in some cases we computed
up to 50.000 replications.
5 RESULTS ON THE MONOTONICITY OF GRAPH
PRIVACY METRICS
Our experiments have yielded results for 792 individual
scenarios, i.e. 792 combinations of dataset, anonymizer, de-
anonymizer, and adversary strength type, with each sce-
nario composed of results for six adversary strength levels.
In this section, we discuss our results for monotonicity and
analyze the factors that influence monotonicity. Results for
the additional criteria evenness and shared value range are
in the next section.
5.1 Overview of Results
Figure 2 shows detailed results for three metrics in six of our
792 scenarios. Each subfigure shows of a sequence of box
plots, one for each adversary strength level, with rotated
histograms indicating the distribution of metric values col-
lected from all replications. Black horizontal lines indicate
confidence intervals for the mean, italic values on top of
each box indicate the mean value, and the green line at the
top (resp. bottom) indicates whether higher (resp. lower)
values indicate higher privacy.
According to our monotonicity criterion, we expect that
boxes on the right-hand side of the plots are closer to
the green line than boxes on the left, i.e. that metrics
indicate higher privacy for lower adversary strengths. The
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Fig. 2. Detailed results for a selection of metrics.
first row shows the adversary’s success rate in two scenarios
(Figures 2a–2b). In both cases, the metric indicates a clear
decrease in the success rate from left to right, with a mono-
tonicity score of 1.0.
The plots in the second row show the anonymity set
size in two scenarios (Figures 2c–2d). In Figure 2c, the low
monotonicity score results from a change in the wrong
direction: instead of the anonymity set size getting larger with
decreasing adversary strength, it is actually getting smaller.
The lack of variation in Figure 2d is due to an undoc-
umented implementation detail in SecGraph: for all de-
anonymizers that use the global graph structure (ADA, DV,
JLSB), the SecGraph implementations process the graph in
chunks to keep the runtime within reasonable limits (as the
plot shows, we chose a chunk size of 100). This chunking
does not have a large effect on the adversary’s success rate
because the nodes in the anonymized and auxiliary graphs
are ordered by their degrees before chunking. However,
metrics that use the adversary’s probabilities are skewed by
this artificial limit.
The third row (Figures 2e–2f) shows entropy in two
scenarios. Entropy measures the adversary’s uncertainty, and
we expect that entropy increases with higher anonymization
levels. In Figure 2e, the general trend of the metric is in the
right direction. However, the monotonicity score is only a
medium 0.46 because some of the adversary strength levels
have no statistically significant difference. Figure 2f shows
how entropy is affected by SecGraph’s chunking strategy:
the artificial limit of 100 candidates for each node results in
almost constant values for entropy throughout.
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Fig. 3. Heat map visualizing monotonicity scores for all privacy met-
rics in our study, depending on the deanonymization algorithm (top),
anonymization algorithm (bottom), and graph dataset (left). Each cell
averages results for varying seed numbers, varying aux ratios, and all
replications. Light yellow colors indicate low monotonicity (weak metric),
and dark blue colors indicate high monotonicity (strong metric).
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Fig. 4. Box plot showing the ranking of privacy metrics according to
their monotonicity scores. Each box summarizes monotonicity for all
anonymization and deanonymization algorithms and all graph datasets.
Per-graph metrics are marked in bold.
We have applied the algorithm described in Section 3.5
to summarize the individual results from Figure 2 into
monotonicity scores. Figure 3 shows these monotonicity
scores on a heat map. Each field in the heat map represents
one set of box plots from Figure 2. As an example, we have
highlighted the field corresponding to Figure 2a with a red
outline. The heat map shows that only few metrics have
high monotonicity, most notably the adversary’s success rate
and the amount of leaked information. These metrics are based
on the count of nodes that the adversary has successfully
re-identified.
Most other metrics have medium or low monotonicity.
This includes almost all metrics that are based on the adver-
sary’s probability distribution, for example entropy and the
metrics derived from entropy.
Figure 4 shows the monotonicity scores for all metrics
in a box plot where each box combines the monotonicity
scores for all anonymization algorithms, all deanonymiza-
tion algorithms, and all graph datasets. The plot is ordered
according to the average score. We can see that most metrics
have monotonicity scores below 0.5, which indicates that
they are not monotonic for most anonymization levels and
thus should be used with caution, if at all. In addition, many
metrics that perform well in other domains do not perform
well when applied to graph privacy, for example normalized
entropy and the anonymity set size. We investigate the reasons
for this in the following two sections.
5.2 Analysis of Factors Influencing Monotonicity
We have defined monotonicity as a property of privacy
metrics, so we expect that the metrics should be the main
determining factor for the value of monotonicity. However,
we have evaluated monotonicity in complex scenarios that
include different graph datasets, anonymization algorithms,
TABLE 4
MARS model showing which factors influence monotonicity, in order of
importance
monotonicity =
0.26
+ 0.095 * metric Relative entropy
+ 0.11 * metric Percentage incorrectly classified
+ 0.2 * metric Pearson correlation
+ 0.19 * metric Norm. variance
+ 0.064 * metric Min-entropy
+ 0.1 * metric Mean squared error
+ 0.12 * metric Max-entropy
+ 0.058 * metric Loss of anonymity
+ 0.16 * metric Incorrectness
+ 0.11 * metric Anonymity set size
+ 0.41 * metric Amount leaked information
+ 0.37 * metric Adversary’s success rate
+ 0.41 * metric Adversary’s overall success
+ 0.24 * metric Absolute error
+ 0.089 * anonymizer IDrem.
+ 0.082 * anonymizer k-DA
+ 0.09 * anonymizer Switch
+ 0.082 * anonymizer t-mean
+ 0.026 * de-anonymizer JLSB
+ 0.037 * de-anonymizer YG
- 0.066 * max(0, dataset pgp - 0)
+ 5.4e-06 * max(0, 10680 - nodes)
- 5.7e-06 * max(0, nodes - 10680)
- 2.9e-06 * max(0, 13838 - edges)
+ 3.6e-07 * max(0, edges - 13838)
+ 8.3e-11 * max(0, 7.3e+08 - claws)
+ 1.7e-11 * max(0, claws - 7.3e+08)
- 0.0083 * max(0, 7.7 - avg. degree)
and deanonymization algorithms. Each of these factors may
influence the value of monotonicity as well. To find out to
what extent the variation in monotonicity can be explained
by each of these factors, we used multivariate adaptive
regression splines (MARS) [5] to analyze how much each
of them contributes to the final monotonicity score . MARS
is more suitable than linear regression in this case because it
accounts for non-linearity and interactions between the vari-
ables and automatically selects the most important variables
to include in the model.
Table 4 shows the contribution of each factor according
to the MARS analysis. The results show that metrics are
indeed the most important contributors and have by far the
largest influence on the monotonicity score. In contrast, the
influence from anonymizing/de-anonymizing algorithms
and graph statistics is much smaller. In many cases, the
influence was so small that the variables were not important
enough to be included in the model at all.
We fit a linear regression to the data to confirm this find-
ing and found that all graph statistics combined account for
less than 2% of the variation in monotonicity (R2 = 0.013),
and the anonymizer, de-anonymizer, dataset and graph type
combined account for less than 8% (R2 = 0.074).
We conclude that despite our complex evaluation setup,
monotonicity is primarily influenced by the choice of metric,
and not by the dataset or anonymization/de-anonymization
algorithms. Because we have evaluated a wide range of
datasets, anonymizers, and de-anonymizers, we are confi-
dent that our results on the monotonicity of graph privacy
metrics hold also for other datasets and algorithms.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of the adversary’s estimate for elections, NS, k-DA. Figure (a) shows all values, (b) and (c) cut off all probability values smaller
than p, and (d) shows the probability distribution for the most likely candidate node.
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5.3 Analysis of Non-monotonic Metrics
Our results show that some metrics that are popular and
monotonic in other application domains are not monotonic
when measuring graph privacy. In this section we analyze
why this is the case for information theoretic metrics based
on entropy and the anonymity set size. We also analyze the
behavior of the adversary’s success rate in detail.
5.3.1 Entropy affected by low-probability candidates
One reason why entropy and metrics derived from entropy
have low monotonicity scores may be that low-probability
candidates have a large influence on entropy [4], [18]. To find
out whether this is the case here, we plot the adversary’s
probability distribution using a histogram with 100 bins
(Figure 5a). The histogram clearly shows that most values
are in the left-most bin, indicating that most probabilities are
below 1%, which confirms the presence of a large number
of low-probability candidates.
As suggested in [4], a possible way of dealing with these
low-probability candidates is to calculate entropy based on
a quantile of the adversary’s probability distribution, i.e.
to remove a certain portion of low-probability candidates
before calculating the entropy value. To evaluate the effect
of this, we define versions of entropy that cut off probabil-
ity values below p before the calculation. Figure 6 shows
the detailed results and monotonicity scores for three of
these modified entropies, with p = {0.0001, 0.001, 0.01},
and Figures 5b–5c show the corresponding histograms for
the adversary’s probability distribution. We can see that
removing probability values below 0.0001 does not improve
the monotonicity score for entropy, 0.001 shows a moderate
improvement, and 0.01 shows a clear improvement.
Depending on the anonymization algorithm, removing
small probability values corresponds to removing a cer-
tain percentile of the adversary’s probability distribution:
removing probability values below 0.0001 corresponds to
removing 0.16% of the probability distribution, removing
p < 0.001 corresponds to removing 55%, and removing
p < 0.01 corresponds to 97% of the probability distribution.
Even though entropy in the last case is monotonic, it is
questionable whether it still makes sense as a privacy metric
because it only evaluates the adversary’s uncertainty based
on the top 3% of her probability distribution.
Another way of dealing with low-probability candidates
is to use min-entropy, a variant of entropy that is calculated
based only on the most likely candidate. However, as Fig-
ure 6d shows, min-entropy shows the same non-monotonic
behavior as entropy. To explain why, we plot the distribution
of the adversary’s probability for the most likely candidate
for each node in Figure 5d. The figure shows that for the
majority of nodes, the adversary makes a mapping decision
based on a probability smaller than 1% (the left-most bin).
Just like entropy, min-entropy is therefore influenced by low-
probability candidates.
As a result, entropy-based metrics do not seem to be
suitable to evaluate graph privacy, even if only a certain
percentile of the adversary’s distribution is used in their
calculation.
5.3.2 Metrics affected by SecGraph’s chunks
We have shown in Figure 2d that the anonymity set size
can be influenced by SecGraph’s strategy of processing
graphs in chunks. This chunking does not necessarily result
in low monotonicity scores because the metric values are
often indistinguishable from one adversary strength to the
next, which results in a medium monotonicity. However,
the semantics and interpretation of the metric are affected:
in the case of the anonymity set size, the interpretation is no
longer “all nodes that the adversary cannot distinguish,” but
instead “all nodes that the adversary cannot distinguish and
that are in a group of 100 nodes with similar node degrees.”
This change in interpretation can make the metric unsuitable
for evaluating graph privacy.
To analyze whether the anonymity set size is the only met-
ric affected by SecGraph’s chunking, we plot the maximum
values for each metric separately for each de-anonymizing
algorithm. If a metric is affected by chunking, the four
deanonymizers that use chunking (ADA, DV, JLSB, KL)
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Fig. 7. Maximum values for four metrics across all datasets and anonymizers, by de-anonymizing algorithm. The adversary’s success rate is not
affected by SecGraph’s chunking, whereas the other three metrics are: their maximum values have an artificial upper limit.
should show a consistent upper limit, whereas NS and YG
should not. Figure 7 shows these plots for four example
metrics. It is clear that the anonymity set size, mutual informa-
tion, and entropy are affected by chunking, but the adversary’s
success rate is not. Table 2 (column chunk) indicates which
metrics are negatively affected by SecGraph’s chunking.
5.3.3 Adversary’s Success Rate vs Overall Success Rate
We have already mentioned the difference between the
adversary’s success rate and adversary’s overall success in Sec-
tion 3.4: success rate is based on the number of attempted
de-anonymizations, whereas overall success rate is based
on the total number of nodes in the graph. We will show in
this section why this difference can lead to misjudgment of
privacy levels when comparing different de-anonymization
algorithms.
We have studied two groups of de-anonymization al-
gorithms: global algorithms (ADA, DV, JLSB) re-identify
nodes based on the global graph structure, whereas local
algorithms (KL, NS, YG) use only local information such
as the number of neighbors. Local algorithms generally
bootstrap from the given seed mappings and iteratively add
nodes to the set of seeds, stopping when no more nodes can
be added. As a result, local algorithms attempt to re-identify
fewer nodes than global algorithms, and this increases their
success rate (which is based on attempted nodes) compared
to global algorithms.
Figure 8 compares the two metrics for each of the six
de-anonymization algorithms. We can see that the adver-
sary’s overall success (light color) is nearly equal for all six
algorithms, especially when comparing the median value
indicated by the line in each box. For the global algorithms,
the adversary’s success rate is very close to the adversary’s
overall success. In contrast, the local algorithms report a much
higher success rate than overall success rate.
There is no doubt that the adversary’s success rate can be
a useful metric, for example to highlight the potential of
a deanonymizer if the right kind of auxiliary information
is available to the adversary. However, it is unsuitable for
comparing different deanonymizing algorithms because it
reports inflated success rates for local algorithms.
6 RESULTS ON ADDITIONAL CRITERIA
Our analysis so far has focused on the monotonicity of
privacy metrics. However, as the comparison between the
adversary’s success rate and overall success rate has shown,
monotonicity is not always a sufficient criterion to select
privacy metrics. Prior work has identified evenness and
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Fig. 8. Comparison between the adversary’s success rate and the
adversary’s overall success. De-anonymizers that use local information
(KL, NS, YG) have an inflated success rate because it is normalized with
the number of attempted re-identifications.
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Fig. 9. Metric values visualized on the edges of a circular graph layout.
Light colors: high privacy, gray: de-anonymization not attempted.
shared value range as additional criteria for metric selection
especially for within-scenario comparisons (evenness) and
between-scenario comparisons (shared value range) [36].
6.1 Evenness
To illustrate the requirement for evenness, Figure 9 com-
pares two privacy metrics applied to the same scenario.
Each subfigure shows the graph dataset in a circular lay-
out, with the nodes colored according to their privacy.
Light colors indicate high privacy, and nodes for which
deanonymization has not been attempted are colored gray.
Incorrectness on the left (Figure 9a) has a low evenness
score (0.14), which can be seen by the absence of medium
and dark colors. In contrast, pearson correlation on the right
(Figure 9b) has a high evenness score (0.89), which is visible
in the clear representation of light, medium, and dark colors.
Metrics with a high evenness score thus allow to analyze
which nodes in a graph have better privacy protection than
others.
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Fig. 10. Box plot showing the ranking of privacy metrics according to
their evenness scores.
We have computed evenness scores according to the de-
scription in Section 3.6 for all 792 scenarios. Figure 10 shows
a ranking of privacy metrics according to their average
evenness score, with the boxes indicating the distribution
of scores across all scenarios. Among the metrics with an
average evenness score above 0.5, four metrics also have
a monotonicity score above 0.5: adversary’s overall success,
adversary’s success rate, pearson correlation, and normalized
variance.
6.2 Shared Value Range
To illustrate the requirement for a shared value range, we
show two metrics, pearson correlation and anonymity set size,
in four scenarios each in Figure 11. The top row shows pear-
son correlation with a consistent value range of [0,1] in every
scenario. In contrast, the bottom row shows the anonymity
set size, where each scenario uses a different portion of the
global value range, depending on the size of the graph,
the anonymization/de-anonymization algorithms and how
they are implemented. This indicates that the anonymity set
size is less suitable for comparisons between scenarios than
pearson correlation.
Figure 12 shows the distribution and average values for
the shared value range score across all scenarios. Only three
metrics have a shared value range score above 0.5 as well as
a monotonicity score above 0.5: pearson correlation, absolute
error, and normalized variance.
7 RECOMMENDATIONS: METRICS SUITES
Based on our experimental results and the analysis in the
previous sections, we can see that no single metric is the
ideal metric for all scenarios. The metrics with the highest
monotonicity are per-graph metrics, so they do not provide
information about the privacy levels of individual nodes in a
graph. Most of the other metrics have very low monotonic-
ity, and only seven metrics have an average monotonicity
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Fig. 12. Box plot showing the ranking of privacy metrics according to
their shared value range scores.
score of 0.5 or above. When considering evenness and
shared value range in addition to monotonicity, only two
metrics have high scores in all three criteria (pearson cor-
relation and normalized variance). Finally, another important
consideration is the semantics of metrics and their interpre-
tation. In this regard, it is desirable to measure different
aspects of privacy, for example in terms of the categories
described in Section 3.4.
Therefore, our recommendation is to combine several
privacy metrics in a metrics suite. To allow for easy compar-
isons between anonymizing or de-anonymizing algorithms,
and to be able to decide which provides the best or worst
privacy levels, it is desirable to combine the metrics in a
suite into a single number. This is not a straightforward task
12
because metrics have different scales of measurement and
different directions (for some, higher values indicate higher
privacy, for others, lower values). A simple average is there-
fore unlikely to yield good results, and any normalization
has to carefully consider direction and value range.
7.1 Combining Metrics in a Metrics Suite
The problem of combining metrics is similar to a problem
in operations research: given a set of alternatives and a
number of criteria for each alternative, which alternative is
best? Many methods have been proposed for multi-criteria
decision analysis [29]. The simplest method is the weighted
sum model (WSM), which ranks alternatives according to a
weighted sum of the criteria values. However, this method
is only applicable if the criteria are measured on the same
scale and in the same units. The weighted product model
(WPM) instead computes the relative importance Qi of
each alternative i using a weighted product. Applied to
the case of privacy metrics, each criterion j corresponds
to one privacy metric, and the set of alternatives is the set
of scenarios (e.g., anonymization algorithms or parameter
settings) that need to be compared in terms of their privacy.
According to [29], the relative importance of each alternative
i is computed as
Qi =
n∏
j=1
(xij)
wj ,
where wj is the weight assigned to each metric, and xij is a
normalization of the metric value xij such that
xij =
xij
maxi xij
if higher values indicate higher privacy, and
xij =
mini xij
xij
if lower values indicate higher privacy. The advantages of
WPM are that different units of measurement are effectively
eliminated due to the use of multiplication instead of ad-
dition, that the built-in normalization can integrate higher-
better and lower-better metrics, and that it does not suffer
from rank reversals that can occur with additive methods
[28].
7.2 Choosing Metrics for a Metrics Suite
As we have already discussed above, every metric in a
metrics suite should have a monotonicity score of at least
0.5. The choice of metrics can then depend on the specific
demands of the application and might include metrics with
high evenness, metrics with high shared value range, met-
rics from different categories, and metrics that are easy to
interpret in the application context.
In our experiments, the seven metrics that have high
monotonicity scores are the adversary’s overall success, amount
leaked information, adversary’s success rate, absolute error, pear-
son correlation, normalized variance, and incorrectness. This
list includes metrics with high evenness and shared value
range, and cover fours different categories (information
gain/loss, error, similarity, success probability). The list
also includes the adversary’s success rate which is the most
common metric to evaluate graph privacy.
7.3 Evaluating the Performance of Metrics Suites
To find out which combination of metrics results in the
best metrics suite, we have evaluated all metrics suites
resulting from combinations of the top-7 monotonic metrics.
A good metrics suite should create a monotonic ranking
of alternatives. Based on our experimental data, we can
evaluate the monotonicity of metrics suites as follows. Each
of our 792 scenarios consists of six adversary strength levels,
with increased strength defined either by an increase in
the number of seed mappings or by an increase in the
overlap of the auxiliary graph. We can therefore use each
scenario as one set of six alternatives, using the increasing
strength levels as the ground truth for how the alternatives
should be ranked. For each set of alternatives, we used the
mean metric values across all replications as xij and then
count how many of the six strength levels have been ranked
monotonically by the metrics suite score Qi.
We find that most metrics suites create monotonic rank-
ings for more than 80% of scenarios, and only metrics suites
that include none of the top-3 metrics create monotonic
rankings for less than 70% of scenarios. In comparison, the
best individual metrics (adversary’s overall success and amount
information leaked) create monotonic rankings for 88.2% of
scenarios.
Table 5 summarizes the composition and weights for
four of the top-scoring metrics suites and the best individual
metric. When choosing all weights wj to be equal, the best
metrics suite, consisting of pearson correlation, adversary’s
overall success, normalized variance and amount leaked informa-
tion, ranks 88.6% of scenarios monotonically. Importantly,
this is better than the result for the best individual metric.
When choosing unequal weights, the best metrics suite
we have been able to construct consists of pearson correlation,
normalized variance, incorrectness, amount leaked information,
adversary’s success rate, adversary’s overall success, and absolute
error with weights wi = 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.25, 0.1, 0.25, 0.1. This
metrics suite creates monotonic rankings for 89% of scenar-
ios.
In summary, we find that combining privacy metrics in
a metrics suite can improve monotonicity above the mono-
tonicity of individual metrics. This is an important result
that shows a concrete method towards more monotonic and
thus more accurate evaluations of privacy.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the strength of 26 privacy metrics
for graph privacy in terms of their monotonicity, evenness,
and shared value range. We conducted extensive experi-
ments on 11 public graph datasets, using 6 anonymiza-
tion algorithms and 6 de-anonymization algorithms. We
found that most metrics are not monotonic when applied
in graph privacy, including several metrics that are popular
and monotonic in other fields. Our detailed analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of these metrics led us to propose
metrics suites, that is, combinations of privacy metrics that
can combine the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of
individual metrics. To the best of our knowledge, we were
the first to apply techniques from multi-criteria decision
analysis to privacy measurement and found that the result-
ing metrics suites can indeed increase monotonicity above
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TABLE 5
Composition of four metrics suites (S2 to S5) and the percentage of
monotonic rankings resulting from their aggregation with WPM,
compared with the best individual metric (S1).
Metrics Weights % mono
S1 Adversary’s overall success equal 88.2
S2 Adversary’s overall success, Norm.
variance
equal 88.6
S3 Pearson correlation, Adversary’s over-
all success, Norm. variance, Amount
leaked information
equal 88.6
S4 Pearson correlation, Adversary’s over-
all success, Norm. variance, Amount
leaked information, Incorrectness
0.1, 0.35,
0.1, 0.35,
0.1
88.7
S5 Pearson correlation, Norm. variance,
Incorrectness, Amount leaked informa-
tion, Adversary’s success rate, Adver-
sary’s overall success, Absolute error
0.1, 0.1,
0.1, 0.25,
0.1, 0.25,
0.1
89.0
the monotonicity of the best individual metric. This result
opens up a new line of research that may lead to significant
improvements in privacy measurement.
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